RASC News Agency: Relations between the Taliban and Pakistan have deteriorated sharply in recent months, descending into one of the gravest crises since the Taliban’s return to power in Kabul. In April, after both sides had reportedly agreed during peace negotiations to pursue a reduction in violence, Pakistani missiles struck a university campus and a residential neighborhood in Afghanistan’s Kunar province. Unlike previous confrontations, which were generally brief and geographically contained, this latest escalation has evolved into a structural rupture in bilateral relations.
Since the current phase of hostilities began in February, Pakistani forces have launched a military campaign dubbed “Ghadhab lil-Haq” (“Wrath for Justice”), conducting extensive air and missile strikes deep inside Taliban-controlled territory, including areas in Nangarhar, Kabul, and Kandahar. In response, Taliban forces targeted Pakistani military installations near the border in retaliatory attacks.
The intensity of this breakdown is particularly striking given the historical trajectory of relations between the two sides. Pakistan and the Taliban maintained close ties throughout the two decades of the insurgency. When the Taliban regained power in 2021, numerous Pakistani officials including then-Prime Minister Imran Khan publicly welcomed the development, portraying the Taliban as a “natural ally” and describing their victory as a strategic achievement that had, in Khan’s words, “broken the chains of slavery.” Yet, within four years, those expectations have given way to profound mistrust and open hostility.
The roots of the current crisis lie in several interconnected factors: a geopolitical environment conducive to confrontation, the absence of effective security guarantees, the growing threat posed by Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Taliban’s refusal to conform to Islamabad’s long-standing expectations regarding “strategic depth,” and the evolving regional engagement between the Taliban and rival powers.
At the international level, the strategic landscape has shifted considerably. The United States remains preoccupied with military tensions involving Iran and broader Middle Eastern crises, while Russia continues to devote substantial resources to the war in Ukraine. China’s reluctance to become deeply entangled in Afghanistan despite its desire to preserve strong relations with Pakistan has created an environment in which escalation has become easier to sustain. The repeated failure of mediation efforts aimed at producing a lasting settlement reflects this reality.
Any serious analysis of the Taliban-Pakistan crisis must therefore be situated within this broader geopolitical context. Pakistan’s continuing military operations inside Taliban-controlled territory have unfolded at a moment when major global powers are consumed by crises elsewhere, enabling Islamabad to act with comparatively limited international scrutiny or accountability.
Unlike previous episodes of tension that were rapidly contained through diplomatic intervention, the current escalation illustrates the absence of external guarantors capable of enforcing restraint. This vacuum in deterrence has continuously fueled the cycle of retaliation. Prior to the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul, the international diplomatic and military presence in Afghanistan functioned however imperfectly as a mechanism that discouraged unchecked escalation. The Taliban’s return to power dismantled that security architecture, creating conditions for increasingly unrestrained confrontation.
As a consequence, Pakistan now enjoys considerably greater freedom to determine both the timing and scope of its responses. The United Nations has reported that an attack on a drug rehabilitation hospital in Kabul on 16 March resulted in the deaths of at least 269 people, with another 122 wounded. Last month, Syed Jamaluddin University in Kunar was also struck without any meaningful international response. The absence of effective deterrence has significantly heightened the risk of a prolonged and potentially unmanageable conflict.
Islamabad had anticipated that, following the Taliban’s return to power, the group would either dismantle or effectively contain Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Instead, a striking paradox has emerged. Pakistani authorities accuse the Taliban of providing TTP militants with sanctuary, training opportunities, and material support. Since 2022, TTP has carried out a series of deadly attacks against Pakistani security forces, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. The Taliban have consistently rejected these allegations, insisting that TTP constitutes an internal Pakistani matter.
Yet the broader reality of Taliban rule presents darker implications for regional stability. In Geneva, Volker Turk, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, stated that the “avalanche of decrees and regulations” issued by Taliban authorities since their return to power had exerted a “crushing impact” on the people of Afghanistan, especially women and girls. According to UN assessments, approximately 21.9 million people equivalent to 45 percent of the country’s population require humanitarian assistance.
Meanwhile, Human Rights Watch has documented patterns of arbitrary detention and torture targeting journalists, the prohibition of live political broadcasts, and directives requiring media organizations to interview only individuals approved by authorities. Critics argue that this increasingly authoritarian system has not only eliminated civic space but has also destroyed internal mechanisms capable of generating accountability or meaningful reform.
When the Taliban first returned to power, many Pakistani policymakers viewed the development as the realization of the doctrine of “strategic depth” the belief that a friendly government in Kabul could serve as a security buffer against India. However, that expectation has proven deeply flawed. The Taliban have demonstrated a greater degree of independence than Islamabad anticipated, pursued a more autonomous regional posture, and cultivated relations with countries beyond Pakistan, including India.
At the same time, the Taliban have barred girls from education beyond the sixth grade and have excluded women from higher education since December 2022. Medical graduation examinations held in November 2025 were conducted for the second consecutive year without female candidates. These policies have not only intensified Afghanistan’s internal humanitarian crisis but have also deepened the Taliban’s international isolation, undermining their capacity to function as an effective regional actor.
The Durand Line remains another major source of friction. Like successive Afghanistani governments before them, the Taliban have refused to recognize the border as an internationally accepted frontier. Concurrently, the Taliban’s renewed engagement with India has added another layer of anxiety to Pakistan’s strategic calculations. Following the October 2025 visit of Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi to India, New Delhi upgraded its technical presence in Afghanistan to a diplomatic mission. From Islamabad’s perspective, such developments evoke fears of “strategic encirclement.”
Military escalation alone is unlikely to address the structural drivers of this crisis. Missile strikes and air campaigns will not compel the Taliban to formally recognize the Durand Line. Nor does severing ties with India appear to be a viable option for the Taliban, for whom diversification of foreign partnerships represents a practical necessity. Similarly, given the Taliban’s current position, the dissolution of TTP remains improbable.
Some analysts contend that Pakistan’s objective is not outright victory but rather the degradation of the Taliban’s military capabilities, including equipment left behind by the United States following its withdrawal. Pakistani officials have claimed that their forces destroyed 243 Taliban positions, captured and subsequently demolished 42 additional outposts, eliminated 219 tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery systems, and conducted air operations across 65 locations throughout Afghanistan. Such an approach appears to reflect a strategy of “strategic denial” rather than one aimed at achieving decisive military triumph.
Facing a powerful India along its eastern frontier, Islamabad may prefer a Taliban administration possessing only limited strategic capabilities on its western border. However, this strategy carries substantial costs. The United Nations has reported that during the first quarter of 2026, violence linked to clashes between Taliban forces and the Pakistani military resulted in the deaths of at least 372 civilians, while 397 others were injured. According to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), this represents the highest number of civilian casualties recorded since 2011.
The continuation of this approach also risks destabilizing border regions, inflaming nationalist sentiments, and eroding Pakistan’s own security and economic foundations at a particularly vulnerable moment. Unless the deeper political, security, and regional drivers of the crisis are addressed through sustained engagement and meaningful confidence-building measures, cycles of escalation are likely to persist.
Under such circumstances, the durability of any future ceasefire or temporary suspension of hostilities will remain highly uncertain, raising profound questions about the prospects for long-term stability between Pakistan and the Taliban.
