RASC News Agency: As the Taliban approach the fifth anniversary of their return to power in August 2026, mounting criticism continues to surround their record in governance, diplomacy, and economic management. According to Dr. Saadia Suleman, Assistant Professor at Quaid-i-Azam University in Islamabad, writing for The Express Tribune, the Taliban have failed to establish a viable framework for political and economic governance during their nearly five years in power. Rather than consolidating the gains achieved during the previous two decades, she argues, the group has reversed many of those advances, leaving Afghanistan economically fragile, politically exclusionary, and socially repressive.
Dr. Suleman identifies one of the Taliban’s most consequential failures as their inability to secure meaningful international recognition. With the exception of Russia, no country has formally recognized the Taliban administration, a reality she characterizes as a major setback for the group’s foreign policy ambitions. According to her analysis, the Taliban’s diplomatic isolation stems from a combination of domestic policies, institutional shortcomings, and persistent security concerns that continue to prevent Afghanistan from achieving broader regional and international integration.
A central factor shaping the Taliban’s foreign relations, she argues, has been the systematic marginalization of the so-called “Doha faction,” a group of relatively pragmatic Taliban figures who played a pivotal role in negotiating the February 2020 agreement with the United States and facilitating the movement’s return to power. While figures such as Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar and Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai remain formally within the Taliban hierarchy, their influence has reportedly diminished significantly. Stanikzai, who had occasionally expressed comparatively moderate views regarding women’s education, is said to have sought refuge in the United Arab Emirates amid concerns for his personal safety. The sidelining of experienced negotiators, the article argues, has deprived the Taliban of some of their most effective interlocutors with foreign governments and international organizations, weakening the regime’s ability to engage constructively with the outside world at a time when diplomatic engagement is critically important.
The international community, meanwhile, remains deeply concerned by the Taliban’s systematic exclusion of Afghanistani women and girls from public life. Dr. Suleman notes that both the European Union and the United Nations have sharply criticized family legislation that effectively removes a minimum age requirement for marriage. European officials have warned that such measures risk normalizing child marriage while imposing additional legal obstacles on women seeking to escape abusive relationships.
Similarly, the European Parliament has adopted resolutions condemning the Taliban’s revised criminal procedure framework, which critics argue institutionalizes discrimination against women through unequal access to justice and punitive legal practices. According to the analysis, these measures have become emblematic of a broader international debate over whether the Taliban are willing or fundamentally unwilling to align themselves with contemporary international norms and standards.
Security concerns have also become a defining feature of the Taliban’s external relations. Dr. Suleman argues that one of the most significant sources of tension between Islamabad and Kabul remains the Taliban’s relationship with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The persistence of cross-border militant attacks has severely strained relations between the two sides despite their long and complex historical connections.
China, likewise, continues to express concerns regarding the presence of militants associated with the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) in Afghanistan and what Beijing perceives as the Taliban’s failure to fully eliminate these networks despite commitments made under the Doha Agreement. The author points to a joint statement issued in December 2025 by Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, in which both sides warned that terrorist organizations operating from Afghanistan continue to pose a serious threat to regional and international security.
Russia has voiced similar concerns regarding the growing activities of ISIS-Khorasan and extremist groups originating from Central Asia. According to Dr. Suleman, Moscow has repeatedly cautioned that instability in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan could destabilize Central Asia and ultimately threaten Russia’s southern security perimeter. Such concerns, she argues, undermine Taliban efforts to portray themselves as a responsible governing authority capable of contributing to regional stability.
The Taliban’s domestic governance model has further complicated their foreign policy objectives. The author contends that the regime’s reliance on coercion, political exclusion, and highly centralized decision-making has discouraged international donors, investors, and development partners from deepening engagement with Afghanistan. A government lacking broad domestic legitimacy, she argues, faces immense difficulty securing legitimacy on the international stage.
The Taliban’s failure to establish an inclusive political order has weakened their claim to represent Afghanistan’s diverse population and has constrained their diplomatic effectiveness abroad. As an example, Dr. Suleman references the February 2024 Doha meeting convened by United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres, which brought together special envoys from 25 countries alongside representatives of the European Union, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
The Taliban refused to participate, insisting that any engagement would be meaningless unless the United Nations recognized them as the sole legitimate representatives of Afghanistan. According to the author, this position reflected a broader effort by the Taliban to monopolize Afghanistan’s international representation while excluding civil society organizations, political opponents, women’s groups, and members of the Afghanistani diaspora from discussions about the country’s future.
Dr. Suleman further argues that the Taliban’s limited diplomatic experience has significantly hindered their foreign policy performance. Many senior Taliban officials, she writes, lack the educational background, institutional expertise, and administrative capacity required for effective modern statecraft and international diplomacy.
This shortcoming is particularly significant given Afghanistan’s strategic geographic position at the crossroads of South Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East, and China. The country possesses considerable potential as a hub for regional trade, transit, and energy cooperation. Yet according to the analysis, the Taliban have failed to capitalize on these opportunities due to a combination of limited vision, weak governance capacity, and diplomatic inexperience.
Countries such as Qatar, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates initially signaled a willingness to play constructive roles in Afghanistan following the withdrawal of U.S. forces. These states maintained channels of communication with the Taliban and possessed the resources necessary to support economic reconstruction. However, the Taliban failed to transform this goodwill into broader diplomatic progress or sustainable international partnerships.
The author adds that the Taliban have even undermined relations with Pakistan, a country long regarded as one of their closest regional interlocutors. By prioritizing ties with militant actors over stable state-to-state diplomacy, she argues, the group has weakened an important bilateral relationship that could have contributed to Afghanistan’s regional integration.
According to Dr. Suleman, the Taliban’s inability to engage effectively with international partners, implement meaningful reforms, and develop a coherent foreign policy consistent with international norms has resulted in the loss of opportunities that might otherwise have reduced Afghanistan’s isolation and improved its standing in the world.
In conclusion, she argues that despite exercising undisputed control over Afghanistan for nearly five years, the Taliban remain politically isolated. The marginalization of moderate voices within their ranks, restrictions imposed on women and girls, concerns over relationships with militant organizations, authoritarian governance practices, and a lack of diplomatic competence have collectively undermined the regime’s quest for international legitimacy.
Until these fundamental challenges are addressed, the author concludes, Afghanistan is likely to remain on the margins of international politics a reality that will continue to constrain both the country’s economic recovery and its prospects for long-term stability and development.
