RASC News Agency: The New York Times has revealed that the collapse of Afghanistan’s previous government stemmed from systematic self-deception embedded in U.S. policymaking. The publication further emphasized that misleading reports by high-ranking U.S. officials significantly contributed to the debacle. In an analysis published Thursday, the Times dissected the reasons behind the United States’ failed 20-year mission in Afghanistan, shedding light on critical missteps.
The report underscored that the downfall of the U.S.-backed Afghanistan administration highlighted broad-scale failures in managing financial resources, understanding cultural complexities, and executing excessively ambitious strategies over two decades. The article claims that senior U.S. officials repeatedly assured Congress and the American public of impending success, all while being acutely aware of the “harsh reality of failure.” For instance, just six days before Afghanistan’s government fell, the Pentagon announced that the country had a robust force of over 300,000 soldiers and police officers. However, for years, experts had raised alarms that no one truly knew the accurate number of active personnel or their operational capabilities.
A key focal point of the report was the systemic misuse of funds. The investigation detailed instances where billions of dollars were funneled into projects that were either impractical or left incomplete. The Times alleged that over the course of two decades, inaccurate and overly optimistic reports were routinely favored over confronting the grim realities. This pattern, it argues, served the dual purpose of maintaining political positions and securing increased funding.
Furthermore, the publication highlighted that Afghanistani soldiers lacked both the motivation and adequate support to sustain their fight. According to the analysis, these critical deficiencies were instrumental in Afghanistan’s ultimate collapse.
