RASC News Agency: The return of the Taliban to power in August 2021 not only failed to stabilize regional security but directly facilitated the resurgence of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) a group that now operates as a powerful militant force along Pakistan’s western borders. This situation exposes the structural inability of the Afghanistani Taliban to contain aligned and ideologically affiliated groups.
In response to rising cross-border attacks, Pakistan has increasingly resorted to airstrikes against alleged TTP safe havens inside Afghanistan a significant shift from its traditional counterinsurgency approach. This development reflects a loss of security trust in the Afghanistani Taliban, who have not only denied the presence of such groups but also refrained from taking meaningful action against them an approach that underscores the deep ideological alignment between the Afghanistani Taliban and the TTP.
As a result, tensions between Islamabad and the Taliban have moved beyond militant threats toward a structural confrontation between two governing authorities.
On March 16, Pakistan conducted airstrikes targeting the “Omid Rehabilitation Center” in Kabul, reportedly killing at least 143 people. International media outlets and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) condemned the attack as one targeting civilians and called for transparent investigations. Pakistan, however, rejected the accusations, claiming it had conducted precise strikes against militant elements.
This incident followed a series of cross-border attacks, including the February 6 bombing at Terleh Imam Bargah, which killed around 30 people, and a February 16 suicide attack on a border post that left 11 dead and dozens injured. Despite announcements of temporary ceasefires, the situation remains fragile and unstable instability rooted in the Afghanistani Taliban’s inability to control affiliated groups.
Islamabad’s decades-long policy of supporting the Afghanistani Taliban now appears to be nearing its end. In 2025, Field Marshal Asim Munir, Pakistan’s army chief, spoke of transforming the country into a “hard state” that responds decisively to both internal and external threats.
In October of the same year, Pakistan carried out strikes on the outskirts of Kabul targeting TTP leadership, particularly Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud. Although mediation by Qatar and Turkey temporarily reduced tensions, the Afghanistani Taliban’s continued ideological rigidity and lack of accountability prevented any lasting stability.
Analysts describe this evolving approach as a “new normal” in Pakistan’s security policy one born from the collapse of trust in the Afghanistani Taliban as a responsible actor.
Since 2004, Pakistan has attempted to manage threats through military deployments in tribal areas and agreements such as Shakai (2004), Srarogha (2005), and Waziristan (2006). The Afghanistani Taliban played mediating roles in these deals, but they were widely criticized within Pakistan as “appeasement of terrorism,” highlighting longstanding doubts about reliance on the group.
Between 2007 and 2018, the TTP weakened following the loss of key leaders. However, after the Afghanistani Taliban’s return to power, the group re-emerged and now operates under the leadership of Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud.
According to a 2021 survey, around 55% of Pakistanis initially welcomed the return of the Afghanistani Taliban. However, those expectations quickly gave way to crisis. The release of approximately 2,300 TTP members by the Afghanistani Taliban, along with the release of 100 militants by Pakistan, significantly strengthened the group.
In 2025 alone, more than 1,000 deadly attacks were recorded in Pakistan, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of security personnel and civilians figures that reflect the Afghanistani Taliban’s clear failure to contain security threats.
Pakistan’s engagement with the Afghanistani Taliban has thus become a strategic miscalculation. Islamabad had assumed that logistical and political support would translate into regional influence. In reality, the Afghanistani Taliban not only failed to align but became a platform for new threats against Pakistan.
The assumption that the Afghanistani Taliban could restrain the TTP or other militant groups also proved misguided. Even Sirajuddin Haqqani acknowledged that the group could only “request” negotiations, not enforce them an admission that highlights the Taliban’s structural and political limitations.
On the issue of the Durand Line, the Afghanistani Taliban have adopted a nationalist stance, extending territorial claims toward the Indus River contrary to Pakistan’s expectations and further intensifying border tensions.
If China’s mediation efforts fail, the likelihood of open conflict between the two countries will increase. Such a scenario could reshape regional dynamics and potentially lead to closer ties between Kabul and New Delhi a development that would pose challenges to Pakistan’s national security.
The ongoing crisis has also intensified economic pressures, including the closure of key border crossings such as Torkham, disrupting trade. Moreover, the instability provides fertile ground for the resurgence of ISIS-K (Islamic State Khorasan).
Overall, the prospect of a broader conflict not only expands the operational space for extremist groups but also demonstrates that the Afghanistani Taliban, rather than acting as a responsible governing authority, have become a driver of deeper regional instability.
