In recent days, following the handover of Afghanistan to the Taliban, General Bismillah Mohammadi has assumed the role of the Minister of Defense for the nation. Afghanistan boasted a formidable army of 359,000 soldiers, equipped with air power and heavy military machinery. The commander of the Afghanistan Air Force was an individual closely affiliated with Mr. Mohammadi from the Northern Front. The Afghanistan populace, oblivious to the behind-the-scenes negotiations between Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai and his inner circle concerning the transfer of Afghanistan to the Taliban, harbored confidence in the capabilities of their country’s security and defense forces. They firmly believed that the irregular Taliban forces, numbering 75,000, were significantly outnumbered by the well-trained national forces, making them incapable of confrontation and triumph.
Mr. Mohammadi, a trusted figure from the Northern Front in Afghanistan, assumed the position of Minister of Defense following the dismissal of General Yasin Zia from the role of Army Chief of Staff and the departure of Asadullah Khalid from the Ministry of Defense. He also assumed control of the Army Staff, a position previously held by General Wali Mohammad Ahmadzai, a close associate of Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai. The appointment of General Bismillah Mohammadi as Minister of Defense during Hamed Karzai’s regime, coupled with his prior role as a trusted figure in various defense and interior ministries and the Army Staff, signaled a departure from conventional military and war principles. He transcended military norms by fortifying the army with former anti-Taliban militant leaders and spearheading a popular movement to defend Afghanistan against the Taliban.
However, it soon became apparent that Mr. Mohammadi’s mission, contrary to the expectations of anti-Taliban figures, aligned with an intensified, gradual handover of districts to the Taliban. This process transitioned from authority transfer at the district level to provinces. Under Mr. Mohammadi’s command, this trend accelerated, reaching the outskirts of Kabul. The reasons and factors leading to the collapse of the two-decade-old Republic system in Afghanistan necessitate careful examination. Nevertheless, the most glaring factor was the nationalistic confrontations within the military apparatus and the appointment of inexperienced, ethnically affiliated Pashtun individuals. According to military traditions, this disrupted the commitment required to execute the entrusted mission against the Taliban.
Bismillah Mohammadi, the last Minister of Defense of the Republic of Afghanistan, entrusted with meticulously fulfilling duties delegated by Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai, deftly orchestrated the meticulously planned course of Afghanistan’s descent and handover. In his ministerial capacity, Mr. Mohammadi refrained from capitalizing on the opportunity to cultivate unity between the army and the firmly established popular forces in support of the military. His deliberate inaction sought to expedite the negotiations of brokers facilitating the relinquishment of Afghanistan. Renowned as an experienced general well-versed in Afghanistan’s internal wars, Bismillah Mohammadi should have, for effective crisis management, thwarting the ongoing surrender of districts, and bolstering the morale of the country’s security and defense forces, reinforced and assimilated adversaries of the Taliban known for their two-decade-long resistance against the group. Contrary to military norms and the principles of war, he dismissed them from the army and reinstated individuals who had shown leniency toward the Taliban, accused of financial corruption.
The roster of directives issued by Mr. Mohammadi during his 40-day tenure in the Ministry of National Defense indicates that he relieved Tajik-affiliated commanders opposing the Taliban from their duties and reinstated individuals who had been dismissed from various army positions due to failure, weakness, and corruption. This calculated approach implies that Mr. Mohammadi’s actions aligned with Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai’s team in surrendering Afghanistan to the Taliban. Given Mr. Mohammadi’s prior association with financial corruption during Hamed Karzai’s regime, notably highlighted by the media for procuring “animal manure” for national defense parks, it appears he once again assumed the role of a negotiator during the handover process.
However, after the handover of Afghanistan to the Taliban and his escape from the country, Mr. Mohammadi, in a note expressing his disassociation, elucidated his 40-day mission. Regarding Ashraf Ghani’s escape, he wrote, “Ashraf Ghani kept me busy with a visit to the Ministry of Defense on the day of his escape.” It is imperative to note that military experts vehemently criticize Mr. Mohammadi’s alignment with Ashraf Ghani’s team in surrendering Afghanistan to the Taliban. They argue that, by declaring a military government and a state of emergency, he could have disrupted the equation of Afghanistan’s national surrender to the Taliban initiated by Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai.
These military experts contend that, for suppressing a coup and significant military movements in a country, control can only be achieved through the judicious and targeted management of the country’s air forces. However, they assert that Mr. Mohammadi chose to abstain from utilizing this option to manage the crisis and the handover of Afghanistan to the Taliban. Insiders reveal that Mr. Mohammadi, as the primary leader in leading the war and defending Kabul, was fully aware of the Taliban fighters entering Kabul. They argue that what he perceived as a normal and routine procedure in the Ministry of Defense during a war was considered part of the daily responsibilities of a responsible official.
In conclusion, Mr. Mohammadi’s role as the Minister of Defense during the collapse of the Republic of Afghanistan has raised concerns among military experts. His actions seem to have facilitated the nationalist handover of Afghanistan to the Taliban, deviating from the expectations of those opposed to the group. Military experts suggest that Mr. Mohammadi had the opportunity to reshape the national surrender equation from Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai to the Taliban by announcing a military government and a state of emergency. However, he chose not to use this option, contributing to the intensification of the handover process and the capture of Kabul by the Taliban.
