By Navid Hussain
RASC News Agency: Afghanistan under Taliban rule has not collapsed, but signs of structural erosion within the regime are more evident than ever. What was presented in 2021 as a “unified victory” has now evolved into a network of internal fractures, tribal rivalries, and power disputes. From the outset, the Taliban were never a fully cohesive ideological movement; they were a heterogeneous coalition of fighters, clerics, tribal factions, and paramilitary networks united primarily by the goal of expelling foreign forces. Once that goal was achieved, suppressed tensions resurfaced at the level of governance.
At the center of this crisis is the growing divide between the Qandahari clerical faction the ideological core of the Taliban and the Haqqani network, the group’s military and security arm. The Haqqanis, who bore the highest human cost during decades of conflict, now perceive themselves as marginalized within the governance structure. This tension underscores that the Taliban lack a sustainable governance model, ruling instead through a fragile balance of coercion, religious legitimacy, and tribal monopoly.
A leaked audio recording attributed to Taliban leader Hibatullah Akhundzada, in which he warns of the potential collapse of the “Islamic Emirate,” serves as an indirect acknowledgment of the regime’s internal legitimacy crisis. Delivered in Qandahar, the ideological heart of the Taliban, the recording illustrates that even the supreme leader struggles to manage the widening rifts. The immediate consequence has been a weakening of Kabul’s authority and a resurgence of opposition forces in northern Afghanistan.
The struggle for power began almost immediately after the fall of Kabul. Qandahari factions sought to remove the Haqqani network from key positions. Sirajuddin Haqqani, who positioned himself as a prime ministerial contender, faced staunch opposition from Qandahari leaders. The dispute even escalated into physical clashes between their associates. Eventually, with tacit backing from Akhundzada, the Qandaharis retained control over councils and installed their deputies in ministries overseen by Haqqani affiliates, effectively sidelining the network from executive authority.
This pattern demonstrates that the Taliban govern not through institutions, but via tribalized power engineering, a system inherently unstable, authoritarian, and opaque. Qandahari leaders have further weakened the Haqqani network through commissions labeled as “reconciliation” and even by targeting Haqqani family-run schools. Sirajuddin’s temporary departure to Dubai in 2025 highlighted the internal crisis, and subsequent negotiations with the Taliban leadership ended in public humiliation, with Akhundzada labeling him as an “agent of Pakistan and the United States.”
The Taliban’s divisions are not merely political they are deeply ideological. The Haqqani network adopts a more pragmatic stance, seeking to reduce international pressure, while Qandahari hardliners impose extreme policies such as banning girls’ education, censoring media, and controlling internet access. This divergence illustrates a crisis in defining “political Islam” within the movement, offering no defensible governance project for Afghanistan’s society.
The prohibition of education for over 2.2 million girls has not only isolated Afghanistan internationally but also intensified internal fractures. Figures like Abbas Stanikzai, who opposed these policies, were removed, highlighting that even intra-ideological dissent is intolerable. A regime that views women’s education as a security threat effectively positions itself against society and the country’s future.
Ethnic considerations remain central to Taliban governance. Pashtun dominance persists, while Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras have been excluded from key positions. Resources, mines, and trade routes are concentrated within Qandahari circles and select families. Reports indicate family-based corruption, monopoly of capital, and power distribution among four main Taliban families. This dynamic transforms the Taliban from a paramilitary organization into a tribal oligarchy.
Analysts argue that the combination of ideological splits, resource competition, structural corruption, and ethnic exclusion is gradually eroding the Taliban’s foundation. Despite an outward appearance of unity, the regime faces an internal crisis rather than an external threat.
By concentrating power, Akhundzada has turned the government into a highly personalized system. Even the prime minister reportedly sees himself as a “rubber stamp.” Decisions are issued from Qandahar, leaving Kabul marginalized.
Amid these deepening fissures, opposition groups such as the National Resistance Front and the Afghanistan Freedom Front have intensified attacks. In December 2025 alone, over 16 attacks occurred across multiple provinces, underscoring the Taliban’s lack of sustained control.
Today, the Taliban are victims of their own contradictions: a regime built on coercion is governed by coercion and will erode through coercion. The clash between hardline Qandaharis and pragmatic Haqqanis, systematic exclusion of non-Pashtun groups, extreme centralization, and social legitimacy crises all indicate that the “Islamic Emirate” lacks durable governance capacity.
While the Taliban may have won the war, they have lost the peace. The true threat to their survival comes not from abroad, but from within their own decaying structure.
